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Abstract
As the United States prepared for the century date change (Y2K) on January 1, 2000,
uncertainty about computer functioning generated uncertainty in capital markets. The
Federal Reserve (Fed) grew particularly concerned that computer malfunctioning would
cause disruptions in the short-term federal funds and repurchase agreement (repo) markets.
Many market participants indicated early in 1999 that they would restrict their normal
trading activities in the weeks leading up to Y2K, which contributed to the Fed’s concern that
liquidity might dry up. To ease pressures, the Fed created two special facilities through the
Open Market Trading Desk of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York (FRBNY). The Standby
Financing Facility (SFF) auctioned three sets of options for overnight repos for dates around
the year’s end to primary dealers. The Fed created the SFF to enable primary dealers to
continue market-making and normal intermediation activities in securities markets in order
to sustain the liquidity of these markets around the century date change. All told, the SFF
auctioned $481 billion of options, though none were exercised. The Fed also created the
Special Liquidity Facility (SLF) to provide term-collateralized funding to depository
institutions around the year’s end, which we describe in a separate YPFS case (see Leonard
2022).
Keywords: broad-based emergency liquidity, century date change, Y2K, open-market
operations, repurchase agreements, repo, options, discount window

This case study is part of the Yale Program on Financial Stability (YPFS) selection of New Bagehot Project
modules considering broad-based emergency lending programs. Cases are available from the Journal of
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Overview
As the United States prepared for the century
date change (Y2K) on January 1, 2000,
uncertainty about computer functioning
generated uncertainty in capital markets. The
Federal Reserve (Fed) grew particularly
concerned that computer malfunctioning
would cause disruptions in the short-term
federal funds and repurchase agreement
(repo) markets (Drossos and Hilton 2000, 1).
In early 1999, many market participants
indicated that they would restrict their
normal trading activities and curtail credit in
the weeks leading up to Y2K, which
contributed to the Fed’s anticipation that
liquidity might dry up (Drossos and Hilton
2000, 1).

Key Terms

In anticipation of Y2K, the Fed examined
“approximately 90 million lines of our own
code contained in thousands of programs and
had to remediate approximately 10 percent
of them” (Kelley 2000). Banks prepared
similarly. Ultimately, the effects of Y2K on
computing systems were negligible (Kelley
2000). However, starting in October,
currency
in
circulation
increased
substantially as banks prepared for a possible
surge in demand (see Figure 1).

Purpose: To “provide tangible encouragement to
primary dealers to continue to make markets and to
undertake their normal intermediation activities in
securities markets, so as to sustain the liquidity of
these markets around the century date change”
(FRBNY 2000, 29)
Launch Dates

August 24, 1999
(Announcement)
October 20, 1999
(Operational)

Expiration Dates

December 1, 2000

Legal Authority

Section 14 of the
Federal Reserve Act

Peak Outstanding

$481 billion in option
purchased, none
exercised

Participants

Primary dealers

Rate

Dutch-style auction,
strike price 150bps over
Federal Funds Rate
(FFR)

Collateral

Discount-window
collateral

Providing liquidity around the century’s end
Loan Duration
Overnight, on exercise
was complicated by a concurrent shift in
date
monetary policy. Between September and
November 1998, the Fed cut rates three Notable Features
Unique auction/option
design
times, including one inter-meeting cut, to
anticipate spillover credit tightening from the
No options exercised;
Russian Ruble crisis and the Asian Financial Outcomes
market calmed
Crisis (CNN Money 1998a; CNN Money
1998a). However, by spring 1999 the Fed
grew concerned about overheating and initiated a tightening cycle, hiking rates in June and
August 1999 (CNN Money 1999a; CNN Money 1999b).
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To ease market liquidity, the Fed created two special facilities through the Open Market
Trading Desk of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York (FRBNY): the Special Liquidity
Facility and the Standby Financing Facility (Drossos and Hilton 2000, 1).4
Figure 1: Currency in Circulation

Source: FRBNY 2000, 6.

The Fed created the SFF to “provide tangible encouragement to primary dealers to continue
to make markets and to undertake their normal intermediation activities in securities
markets, so as to sustain the liquidity of these markets around the century date change”
(FRBNY 2000, 29). To do so, the SFF auctioned options on overnight repo transactions for
exercise on specific days in the three weeks around the century date change (FRBNY 1999b).
The SFF auctioned off overnight repo options in $50 million increments through a Dutchstyle auction (FRBNY 1999a). Options were sold in three “strips” of five consecutive days
each; holders of an option could exercise the option on any date in the strip (FRBNY 1999a).
The strike price—the rate charged if the option was executed—was set at 150 basis points
(bps) or 250 basis points above the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC)’s target federal
funds rate (FRBNY 1999a). Eligible collateral for the SFF included all collateral typically
eligible for repo with the FRBNY. The FOMC also temporarily expanded collateral eligible for

The Fed created the Special Liquidity Facility (SLF) to provide collateralized term loans to depository
institutions and “ensure that [they had] adequate liquidity to meet any unusual demands in the period around
the period date change.” Notably, though, the Fed designed the facility to have a spread high enough to
discourage its use, while still providing a backstop (Board of Governors 1999a; Board of Governors 1999d).
(See Leonard 2022.)
4
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repo to include certain securities issued by the government and the mortgage governmentsponsored enterprises (GSEs) on August 24, 1999 (FRBNY 1999b).
The FRBNY held the first auction for the SFF on October 20, 1999. Demand exceeded the
FRBNY’s expectations, prompting the FRBNY to add two additional auctions on November
23 and December 1, and to increase the volume of options sold at the last few auctions
(Drossos and Hilton 2000, 5).
Over seven auctions, the FRBNY sold $114 billion worth of options on the strip covering
December 23 to December 29, $223 billion on the strip for December 30 through January 5,
and $144 billion on the strip for January 6 through January 12 (FRBNY 2000, 30). The Fed
collected $6 million in premiums from the options (Drossos and Hilton 2000, 5). (See Figure
2.)
Figure 2: Summary of Auction Results for Options (Oct. 20, 1999–Dec. 1, 1999)

Source: FRBNY 2000, 31.
Note: total propositions are total bids for auction; accepted propositions are total bids accepted; the stop-out
rate is the lowest rate on an accepted bid.

Demand for options was highest for the December 30 strip, as the Fed expected. Over the
course of the auctions, the demand curve for options flattened, though all auctions attracted
“a certain number of seemingly aggressive bids” (Drossos and Hilton 2000, 5). The spread
between December and January LIBOR futures contrasts decreased substantially after the
October 27 auction, indicating that the SFF may have calmed markets two months before the
year’s end (Drossos and Hilton 2000, 3). Ultimately, financing rates at the end of the year
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were not elevated and none of the primary dealers exercised their SFF options (Drossos and
Hilton 2000, 5).
Figure 3: Key Rates Around the Century Date Change
Demand Schedules for Dec. 30 Options Strip

Financing Rates Near Century Date Change

Spread Between December and January LIBOR Futures Contract

Source: Drossos and Hilton 2000.

Summary Evaluation
Sundaresan and Wang (2006, 1) find that the SFF “contributed to the drop in the liquidity
premium of Treasury securities” around Y2K. Drossos and Hilton (2000) note that “in
conversations with the Desk, many dealers indicated that the options program helped ease
their anxieties about prospective market conditions around the year-end” (Drossos and
Hilton 2000, 6).
In the August 24, 1999, FOMC meeting, committee members anticipated that “the greatest
impact [the SFF] could have is the announcement effect . . . it would be a measure of success
of the program if very few of these options were exercised” (FOMC 1999, 20). In fact, none

1430

Journal of Financial Crises

Vol. 4 Iss. 2

of the options were exercised, indicating that the program primarily functioned by easing
anxieties around the century date change.
During the Global Financial Crisis (GFC), the Fed implemented a facility with similar design
to the SFF—the Term Securities Lending Facility Options Program (TOP) (FRBNY n.d.). The
TOP offered overnight options to primary dealers to ensure “liquidity over periods of
heightened collateral market pressures.” The TOP held one auction on June 3, 2009, for
exercise on June 24, 2009, to ease quarter-end pressures. The Fed sold $12 billion in options
and none of the options were exercised (FRBNY n.d.).
Administrators of the SFF indicated that by selling options the Desk could provide liquidity
during the century date change without permanently impacting the federal funds rate (FFR).
This was especially useful in the context of a tightening cycle in monetary policy.
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Context: United States 1999–2000

GDP
(SAAR, nominal GDP in LCU
converted to USD)
GDP per capita
(SAAR, nominal GDP in LCU
converted to USD)

$9.900 trillion in 1999
$10.436 trillion in 2000
$34,514 in 1999
$36,335 in 2000
Data for 1999:
Moody’s: Aaa
S&P: AAA
Fitch: AAA

Sovereign credit rating
(five-year senior debt)

Size of banking system
Size of banking system
as a percentage of GDP
Size of banking system
as a percentage of financial system
Five-bank concentration of banking system
Foreign involvement in banking system
Government ownership of banking system
Existence of deposit insurance

Data for 2000:
Moody’s: Aaa
S&P: AAA
Fitch: AAA
$5.378 trillion in 1999
$5.775 trillion in 2000
54.33% in 1999
55.34% in 2000
27.48% in 1999
29.63% in 2000
Data not available
Data not available
Data not available
Data not available
0% in 1999
0% in 2000
Yes, up to $100,000 in 1999

Sources: Bloomberg World Bank Global Financial Development Database, World
Bank Deposit Insurance Dataset.
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Key Design Decisions
1. Purpose: The Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve created the Standby
Financing Facility (SFF) to provide liquidity to primary dealers to ensure market
functioning around the century date change.
The FOMC authorized the SFF on August 24, 1999. The FOMC assigned the administration of
the program to the FRBNY, which manages the discount window (FRBNY 1999b).
The purpose of the SFF was to “provide tangible encouragement to primary dealers to
continue to make markets and to undertake their normal intermediation activities in
securities markets, so as to sustain the liquidity of these markets around the century date
change” (FRBNY 2000). Sources at FRBNY indicated that a key purpose of the FRBNY was to
provide funding to financial institutions that were ineligible for discount-window loans,
through the primary dealers.
At the August 24, 1999, FOMC meeting, committee members highlighted concerns that
primary dealers would not be “willing to be on both sides of the market for us in some depth
. . . market conditions may frustrate the Desk’s ability to add and drain reserves in the period
around the year-end and to keep the funds rate trading around the Committee’s target”
(FOMC 1999, 19).
2. Legal Authority: The SFF derived legal authority from Section 14 of the Federal
Reserve Act.
Section 14 of the Federal Reserve Act gives the Federal Reserve its legal authority to conduct
domestic open market operations programs. The FOMC annually authorizes the New York
Fed to execute open market transactions on the Fed’s behalf. Its directions to the New York
Fed are contained in the Authorization for Domestic Open Market Operations. On August 24,
1999, the FOMC voted unanimously on a temporary addition to that document that
authorized the SFF. Specifically, the FOMC added language to allow the FRBNY to sell options
on repos for exercise no later than January 2000 (Board of Governors 1999b, 820). Unlike
the SLF, the Federal Reserve Board did not have to revise its regulations to create the SFF
(see Leonard, 2022).
3. Part of a Package: The SFF was announced along with other measures to enhance
liquidity availability around the CDC.
The SFF was part of the Fed’s broad, multi-year preparations for the century date change
(Kelley 2000). On August 24, 1999, the FOMC agreed on a number of measures: expanded
accepted collateral at the discount window, authorization to execute repurchase agreements
with up to 90-day maturities, and the SFF (FRBNY 1999b). In a press release on September
8, 1999, the FRBNY announced these measures. It said their purpose was to facilitate “the
smooth functioning of money and financing markets and . . . to manage banking system
reserves” with respect to Y2K (FRBNY 1999b). Previously, on July 20, the Federal Reserve
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Board announced the Special Liquidity Facility to provide collateralized term loans to
depository institutions (Board of Governors 1999a).
4. Management: The FOMC authorized the SFF and managed oversight of the facility.
The FOMC directed the Trading Desk at the Federal Reserve Bank of New York (FRBNY) to
administer the SFF (FRBNY 2000, 1). Disclosure and oversight for the SFF were consistent
with procedures in place for the discount window and open market operations (FRBNY
2000, 4).
5. Administration: The SFF was administered through a Dutch-style auction.
The SFF was administered through a Dutch-style auction, wherein options were auctioned
in $50 million increments, and winners of each auction paid the rate on the lowest accepted
bid (FRBNY 1999a). Auctions for the three strips were initially to be held at 2:30 p.m. on five
Wednesdays, beginning October 20, 1999, and ending November 17, 1999 (FRBNY 1999a).
The FRBNY added two additional auction dates on November 23 and December 1 in response
to higher than expected uptake for the first five auctions (Drossos and Hilton 2000, 5).
6. Eligible Participants: Only primary dealers were eligible for the SFF.
Only primary dealers were eligible for the SFF (FRBNY 1999a). While the SLF provided
liquidity to depository institutions, the Fed worried that a spike in rates around Y2K could
place strain on primary dealers’ positions and therefore limit their ability to make markets,
causing liquidity to dry up. Drossos and Hilton (2000, 2) describe the potential as follows:
If cash investors at year-end refrained from lending to securities dealers except at
exorbitant rates, then the dealers—including primary dealer counterparties in the
Desk’s monetary operations—would be compelled to pay these rates to finance their
holdings of securities. Those dealers that could not pay extremely high rates could be
forced to default.
7. Funding Source: The SFF was funded through an expansion of the Fed’s balance
sheet.
The SFF was funded through the Fed’s balance sheet (FRB 2020).
8. Program Size: The SFF was initially authorized to auction up to $32 billion in
options at its first auction, and to set future offerings in response to demand.
The SFF was initially authorized to auction up to $32 billion in options at the first auction.
The term sheet indicated that for subsequent auctions, the FRBNY would offer similar or
larger amounts depending on demand at the first auction (FRBNY 1999a). At the August 24
FOMC meeting, the FOMC anticipated auctioning $200 billion in options in total (FOMC 1999,
31).
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In practice, the SFF auctioned options worth $42 billion at the first auction, $49 billion at the
second, $95 billion at the third, $120 billion at the fourth, $65 billion at the fifth, $55 billion
at the sixth, and $55 billion at the seventh (FRBNY 2000, 31). The increase in the size of the
auctions was consistent with the SFF’s term sheet, which said that the FRBNY could increase
or decrease the volume of options at auction (FRBNY 1999a). Officials at FRBNY indicated
that they preannounced the total auction size, as well as the auction size per strip.
9. Individual Participation Limits: The SFF imposed limits on the number of bids any
primary dealer could post per strip.
The SFF limited the number of bids an eligible participant could place per strip. Specifically,
a primary dealer could place at most two bids for its own account and no more than two bids
for each customer per strip (FRBNY 1999a).
10. Rate Charged: The SFF sold options through a Dutch-style auction, which, if
executed, were priced 150bps above the federal funds rate.
The SFF auctioned off overnight repo options in $50 million increments through a Dutchstyle auction (FRBNY 1999a). In Dutch auctions, the winners of the auction pay the bid of the
lowest successful bidder, determined by accepting bids—starting with the highest rates
bid—until the amount of accepted liquidity exhausts the amount offered. Options were sold
in three sets, called “strips,” each of five days as shown in Figure 4.
Figure 4: SFF Option Strip Dates
Strip Date
Dec. 23 Strip
Dec. 30 Strip
Jan. 6 Strip

Dates Options Were Exercisable
December 23, 24, 27, 28, and 29
December 30, 31, January 3, 4 and 5
January 6, 7, 10, 11, 12

Source: FRBNY 1999a.

Options bought in a given strip could be exercised on any or all of the days covered by the
strip for up to the total amount that the holder was awarded at auctions for that strip.
Holders of a strip could exercise all or part of the strip as a term repo, covering two, three,
four, or five business days, but had to pre-announce exercise on subsequent days (FRBNY
1999a). For example, a holder of $100 million in Dec. 30 strip options could have exercised
$50 million on December 30 and $50 million on December 31 but had to pre-announce the
exercise of options on December 31.
The strike price for options was set at 150 basis points above the FOMC’s target federal funds
rate as of 10:00 a.m. on the exercise date (FRBNY 1999a). Additionally, options in the
December 30 strip could be exercised after 10:00 a.m. and before 11:30 a.m. with a strike
price of 250 basis points above the FOMC’s target federal funds rate as of 11:30 a.m. on the
exercise date (FRBNY 1999a).
In discussing the proposal at the August 24, 1999, FOMC meeting, committee members
highlighted that “a range of 150 basis points is considerably wider than the range in which
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normal arbitrage takes place” and argued that the facility would offer primary dealers
“market disaster insurance to get them more comfortable intermediating within that range”
(FOMC 1999, 29). Sources at the FRBNY indicated that they chose an auction format to
ensure that options were sold at a market-clearing price rather than as a stigma-limiting
measure.
11. Eligible Collateral: Eligible collateral for the SFF included all collateral typically
eligible for repo with the FRBNY, as well as expanded collateral that the FOMC
approved at its August 24, 1999, meeting.
Eligible collateral for the SFF included all collateral typically eligible for repo with the FRBNY,
as well as additional collateral that the FOMC approved at its August 24, 1999, meeting.
Expanded collateral included pass-through mortgage securities of the Government National
Mortgage Association (Ginnie Mae), Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation (Freddie
Mac) and Federal National Mortgage Association (Fannie Mae); STRIP (Separate Trading of
Registered Interest and Principal of Securities) securities of the US Treasury; and “stripped”
securities of other government agencies (FRBNY 1999b). Stripped securities are coupon
bonds that have been transformed into zero-coupon bonds.
The FRBNY established triparty settlement agreements with two clearing banks to value and
accept delivery of collateral for repo. The FRBNY stated that “as a practical matter, triparty
agreements were needed to facilitate the pricing and valuing of mortgage-based securities
on” repos (FRBNY 2000, 4).
12. Loan Duration: Options, if exercised, bore overnight maturities, though
participants could also select to exercise the option as a term repo with a duration
between two and five days.
The SFF sold options on overnight repurchase agreements (repos), that therefore had
overnight maturities. However, holders of an option could also exercise the option as a “term
repo, covering two, three, four, or five business days, by pre-announcing the exercise of
subsequent days” (FRBNY 1999a).
13. Other Conditions: The FRBNY imposed minimum bids and price-bid increments.
The minimum price a dealer could bid was set at 0.5 basis points (FRBNY 1999a). Minimum
increments were set at 0.5 basis points as well (FRBNY 1999a).
14. Impact on Monetary Policy Transmission: The FRBNY developed strategies for
limiting the impact of the SFF on reserves, in the event that options were
exercised.
In creating the program, the FRBNY developed strategies for offsetting the impact of SFF
options on the level of reserves. The Desk planned “to offset the impact of reserves created
through the exercise of options…by cutting back on the supply of reserves provided through
ordinary RPs…[or entering] the market to drain reserves later in the day” (FRBNY 2000, 30).
If strong upward rate pressures triggered a broad exercise of SFF options, the Desk was
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“prepared to abandon its normal reserve management…and to accept a super-abundance of
reserves created by the options as useful for countering market stress” (FRBNY 2000, 30).
Sources at the FRBNY indicated that by selling options the Desk could provide liquidity
during the century date change without permanently impacting the federal funds rate (FFR).
15. Other Options: The Fed also created the SLF to provide liquidity to depository
institutions.
The Fed also created the SLF, a facility that operated through the discount window to provide
liquidity to depository institutions (see Leonard, 2022).
16. Similar Programs in Other Countries: Some other countries also took special
measures.
Although some other countries also took special measures in anticipation of the century date
change, Sundaresan and Wang (2006, 22) could not find an example of another central bank
that sold options like the Fed’s SFF. Other programs undertaken by other central banks
varied. The Bank of Canada issued Y2K options to depository institutions without a premium.
The Bank of Canada also expanded the range of collateral accepted, like the Fed. The Bank of
England issued special Treasury bills that matured on December 31, 1999; expanded the
range of repo maturities to 90 days; and expanded the range of accepted collateral
(Sundaresan and Wang 2006, 22).
17. Communication: Preparations for the century date change began in late June
1995. Chairman Alan Greenspan discussed the facilities and the century date
change generally on September 17, 1999.
In late 1995, the Fed created the Century Date Change (CDC) project to coordinate Y2K
readiness across the Federal Reserve system. As part of this plan, the CDC project reviewed
every bank by mid-1998 to assess readiness (Kelley 1997). Between 1997 and 1999, the Fed
published contingency planning guides, brochures on bank readiness, and press releases
explaining the impact of the century date change (Board of Governors 1999c).
On September 17, 1999, the Fed held a Year 2000 Summit to discuss the century date change
event, and the actions that the financial sector and the Fed had taken to prepare for the event.
Chairman Greenspan noted that while the financial sector had generally taken the necessary
steps to prepare and that “the technical breakdowns that might occur as a consequence of
the CDC are readily containable,” there was evidence that borrowers and lenders were
building up liquid assets to reduce reliance on credit markets. He said that the SLF and the
SFF “should help to ensure an ample supply of liquidity and relieve funding pressures”
(Greenspan 1999).
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18. Disclosure: The FRBNY published the volume of bids, the range of prices
submitted, and the lowest accepted bid.
In the original term sheet published October 7, 1999, the FRBNY indicated that the day
following each auction it would publish the volume of bids submitted and accepted, the range
of prices submitted, and the lowest accepted bid (stop-out rate). It also indicated that it
would publish the volume of options exercised shortly after the deadline for notice (FRBNY
1999a).
On October 8, 1999, the FRBNY expanded the information it publicly disclosed to make the
SFF “more transparent” (FRBNY 2000, 4). Specifically, the FRBNY additionally published the
weighted average rate on accepted propositions (FRBNY 2000, 4).
19. Stigma Strategy: In discussing the proposal for the facility, FOMC committee
members did not comment on stigma strategy.
At the August 24, 1999, meeting wherein selling Y2K options was first proposed, FOMC
members did not explicitly discuss stigma associated with the facility. Rather, committee
members discussed the price mechanism for the facility so that the price was “low enough
so that we are making insurance available to the market to calm it down but high enough to
provide some constraint on demand,” indicating that they anticipated primary dealer uptake
(FOMC 1999, 32).
Sources at FRBNY indicated that the facility was designed as an auction to ensure that
liquidity was offered at market rates, which would destigmatize borrowers. However, the
program also charged a penalty rate and a fee to limit overuse.
20. Exit Strategy: The SFF was announced with a pre-announced end date, as it held
only a few auctions.
The SFF held only a few auctions, and all options expired by January 12, 2000 (FRBNY
1999a).
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